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 From 1969 to 1993, the United States and NATO conducted a series of military exercises 
for the purpose of preparing to defend Western Europe against a possible Soviet invasion. The 
series of annual exercises dubbed REFORGER (Redeployment of Forces to Germany) utilized 
units that were based in the United States to rapidly deploy to West Germany to conduct 
maneuvers. However, this was not the only purpose of REFORGER. Archival documents 
suggest that another, and perhaps more important intended outcome, was to instill confidence in 
NATO countries regarding the U.S. commitment to the defense of Western Europe. 
 Historians have examined REFORGER in the larger context of evolving Cold War 
military doctrine, Allied foreign policies, and even the danger of a singular exercise that almost 
led to nuclear war.1 However, historians have not yet explored the REFORGER exercises as a 
unique historical event, nor have they examined their impact on U.S.-NATO relations during the 
Cold War. This thesis aims to shed light on the significance of the REFORGER exercises on 
Western defense strategy during the Cold War, the logistics that made them possible, and the 
intended impact of these exercises on the diplomatic relationship between the United States and 
its NATO allies. However, the REFORGER exercises did not occur in isolation from the larger 
events and context surrounding the Cold War; therefore, certain events relating to the origins of 
the Cold War, the foundation and necessity of NATO, larger issues of U.S.-European relations, 
and U.S. Army Cold War policies and doctrine that led up to the first exercise in 1969 form 
essential background to them. 
 
1 Nate Jones, ed., Able Archer 83: The Secret History of the NATO Exercise That Almost Triggered Nuclear War 
(New York: The New Press, 2016). 
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 When considering U.S. and European cooperation in these joint military exercises, one 
must understand the events leading up to the foundation of NATO and the context that made 
these exercises necessary. After the fall of the Third Reich in 1945, Germany was divided among 
the four major Allied Powers: the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and France. 
The three Western allies were agreed on what the post-war world should look like. Nations 
would have the right to govern themselves in democracies and international cooperation would 
lead to new levels of economic development and trade. President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill fleshed out these terms at the Atlantic Conference of August 1941.2 
agreeing to the Atlantic Charter meant that the United Kingdom would eventually have to 
eventually release its colonial territories, allowing the United States to gain more power through 
economic trade and development with the emerging Third World.3 Churchill did not prefer this 
outcome, stating, “I have not become the King’s First Minister in order to preside over the 
liquidation of the British Empire. For that task, if ever it were prescribed, someone else would 
have to be found, and under a democracy I suppose the nation would have to be consulted.”4 
While he clearly disagreed with Britain granting sovereignty to its colonial charges, Churchill 
understood that he needed to cooperate with Roosevelt to gain U.S. support for the war against 
Nazi Germany and signed the charter anyway.  
 As the Cold War progressed through the late-1940s and 1950s, the United States 
gradually replaced Britain as the leader of the West, with the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 being the 
key event. On 29 October 1956 Britain and France, without the United States’ knowledge, 
 
2 “The Avalon Project : THE ATLANTIC CHARTER,” Text, accessed April 2, 2021, 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp. 
3 David Reynolds, “The Wartime Anglo-American Alliance,” in The Special Relationship: Anglo-American 
Relations Since1945 (New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1986), 30. 
4 Winston Churchill, “Prime Minister Winston Churchill Speech at the Mansion House,” November 10, 1942, 
Mansion House, London, U.K., http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/421110b.html. 
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invaded Egypt in conjunction with Israeli forces. President Eisenhower was furious and 
demanded the Anglo-French alliance to withdraw their forces; simultaneously Eisenhower 
ordered the Sixth Fleet to put pressure on the Anglo-French fleet while ordering a series of 
economic sanctions against the two nations. These actions, along with diplomatic pressure 
through the United Nations, led to an Anglo-French withdrawal.5 After this event, it became 
clear that the United States had eclipsed Great Britain as the predominant power in the West. 
 Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin opposed this post-war world order and quickly reneged on 
agreements he made at the Yalta Conference in February 1945.  He determined that the nations 
liberated by Soviet troops should remain under Soviet military control and he began to establish 
communist political systems that answered to the Soviet Union.6 It soon became clear that the 
Soviet Union had no intention of upholding its promises to allow the nations of Eastern Europe 
to determine their own destiny. By the end of 1945, the Cold War between the capitalist West 
and communist East was already underway. 
 U.S. involvement in Europe was a complete reversal of the isolationist policies that the 
United States held before World War II; it was also a change that the events of the aftermath of 
World War II necessitated. There is debate among historians regarding the origins of the Cold 
War and whether or not the conflict could have been avoided by greater attempts at cooperation 
with the Soviet Union. David Shi and George Tindal, however, argue that “the onset of the cold 
war seems to have been inevitable. America’s commitment to capitalism, political self-
determination, and religious freedom conflicted dramatically with the Soviet Union’s preference 
for controlling its neighbors, enforcing ideological conformity, and prohibiting religious 
 
5 Cole C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995). 




practices.”7 If the United States was going to remain the defender of Western democracies and 
the belief that all nations had the right to adopt a governmental system of their choosing, then it 
would inevitably be on a collision course with an expansionist Soviet Union.  
 In the immediate years following the outbreak of the Cold War, tensions between the 
West and Soviet Union grew. State Department officials made it clear that Stalin was determined 
to keep tensions between the ideological opposites high, because it helped bolster the power of 
his totalitarian regime. In a now famous article authored anonymously, director of the State 
Department Planning Staff George Kennan argued that the best policy to counter Soviet designs 
was to contain the spread of communism through the superior economic power of the United 
States and its allies.8 In a March 1947 speech before the U.S. Congress, President Truman 
requested that the United States give $400 million in aid to Turkey and Greece. This was the 
beginning of the Truman Doctrine, and was the first attempt to contain the spread of communism 
through the might of the American economy. Moreover, it set the precedent for the United States 
to be the leader in the fight against communism. Truman said, “I believe that it must be the 
policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by 
armed minorities or outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their 
own destinies in their own way.”9  
 The policies in the Truman administration were not just geared toward nations that were 
facing active communist threats, but all European nations that were under threat from Soviet 
 
7 David Emory Shi and George Brown Tindall, America: A Narrative History, 1st ed (New York: Norton, 1984), 
1003.  
8 X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, 1947, 
https://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=3629. 




expansionism. George C. Marshall, Secretary of State under Truman, laid out a plan that would 
secure U.S. alliances with many major European powers in a speech at Harvard University in 
June 1947. The subsequent European Recovery Plan, colloquially referred to as the Marshall 
Plan, was an economic booster for those countries that were hit hard during World War II. It 
aimed to build up the economies and peoples of Europe and to enhance their trade with the 
United States, which Truman saw as imperative to maintaining U.S. economic strength. In 1948, 
after the fall of a democratic government in Czechoslovakia, the last of its kind in Eastern 
Europe, the U.S. Congress approved the plan and appropriated $13 billion dollars in European 
aid.10 Economist Barry Eichengreen and colleagues note that Marshall plan aid helped European 
industrial output grow by 55 percent in just four years.11 This was the greatest period of 
economic growth in European history, a true recovery from the devastation of World War II.12  
The Marshall Plan was, essentially, the most effective way for the United States to ensure it had 
strong allies in Europe, the presumptive front line in the ongoing struggle with the Soviet Union.  
 Stalin correctly believed that the Marshall Plan was designed to weaken his position in 
Europe. The primary goal of the plan was to aid U.S. allies, and the intended second order 
consequence of that goal was the strengthening of a coalition to counter the Soviet Union. In 
response, Stalin ordered a blockade around the perimeter of West Berlin in the summer of 1948, 
with its American, British, and French zones united into one. If successful, the blockade would 
halt the flow of food and other essential supplies to Berlin, leading to a Soviet takeover of the 
 
10 Barry Eichengreen et al., “The Marshall Plan: Economic Effects and Implications for Eastern Europe and the 
Former USSR,” Economic Policy 7, no. 14 (1992): 13, https://doi.org/10.2307/1344512. 
11 Ibid., 19. 
12 Ibid., 48. 
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pre-war German capital. In response, the Truman administration began an airlift that provided 
2,223,000 daily tons of supplies to West Berlin over the course of thirteen months.13  
 The Berlin Airlift was in part successful because of the Allied ability to work together in 
shipping supplies to West Berlin, and it quickly became clear that the most effective tool in 
containing the Soviet threat was sustained political and military cooperation. The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, commonly known as NATO, became the premier institution to protect 
Western Europe from the Soviet Union with the signing of the Washington Treaty on 4 April 
1949.14 The first member nations were among those that benefitted most from the Marshall Plan; 
the unifying ideology of Western democracy brought the countries together; and a strong and 
economically powerful international leader, the United States, backed up NATO’s conventional 
military strength with a nuclear umbrella. The purpose of NATO was mutual defense; an attack 
on one nation would be seen as an attack on all nations, and while the USSR did not have much 
to fear from the military might of the Netherlands or Luxembourg, the United States was a major 
strategic competitor it could not ignore. The United States had committed itself to the defense of 
Western Europe and helped in the formation of the global institutions that would manage the 
Cold War.15  
 After the formation of NATO, the Cold War, and the U.S. approach to it, constantly 
evolved. The Soviet acquisition of nuclear weaponry in 1949 prompted President Truman to 
order the National Security Council to draft a report that would examine the role and 
responsibilities of the United States in the Cold War. The result was National Security Council 
 
13 John Steven Brunhaver, “The Berlin Airlift: Lifeline from the Sky” (Air University Press, 1996), 21, JSTOR, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13825.9. 
14 “What Is NATO?” Accessed September 13, 2020, https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html. 




Memorandum 68 (NSC-68). NSC-68 determined that the Soviet Union was growing as a threat, 
especially with the buildup of atomic weapons, and advised that the United States bolster its own 
military capabilities and further develop its containment policies.16  
 The United States quadrupled its defense spending during the Korean War (1950-1953), 
operationalizing containment as a military strategy as well as a political and economic one.17 The 
Eisenhower administration, however, viewed this level of spending as unsustainable. It 
maintained that the key to the global conflict against communism was containment but changed 
the way in which the United States would prosecute the strategy. Newly elected President 
Dwight Eisenhower, along with Secretary of State John Dulles, determined that threatening 
massive nuclear retaliation was the most economical way to prosecute containment. Historian 
Ingo Trauschweizer writes, “After the Korean War, the Army defined its primary mission as 
deterrence in Central Europe.”18 Moreover, “Deterrence has generally been understood as a 
function of nuclear arsenals.”19  
 Deterrence linked to massive retaliation was fraught with major issues that NATO 
fleshed out with military exercises. Exercise Carte Blanche, which NATO executed in the 
summer of 1955, was designed to determine the effects of a nuclear war in Europe. The result 
was a catastrophic destruction of German territory.20 It quickly became clear that the Allied 
powers would have to adjust their strategy to not only rely on nuclear deterrence but adopt more 
conventional deterrents in an effort to limit the damage to NATO territory in the event of a war 
 
16 “Milestones: 1899–1913 - Office of the Historian,” accessed November 1, 2019, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/war. 
17 Allan Reed Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of 
America (New York : London: Free Press ; Collier Macmillan, 1984), 453. 
18 Ingo Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War, Modern War Studies 
(Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 1. 
19 Ibid., 1. 
20 Ibid., 44. 
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with the Soviet Union. General Maxwell Taylor, Eisenhower’s Army Chief of Staff from 1955-
1959, was among the first to openly criticize Eisenhower’s policies of Massive Retaliation in his 
book.  
 The Uncertain Trumpet, published in 1959, Taylor criticized the strategy of Eisenhower’s 
New Look and recommended the strategy that would see the United States, and its allies, through 
the remainder of the Cold War. As seen in Exercise Carte Blanche, Taylor determined that the 
threatened use of nuclear weapons to ensure U.S. national security had a grave and fatal flaw.21 
Taylor argued that Massive Retaliation and nuclear supremacy were ineffective, with the best 
example being the conventional war fought in Korea proving that an atomic monopoly did not 
prevent states from engaging in conventional wars.22 Taylor instead recommended a strategy 
which came to be known as Flexible Response:  
The National Military Program of Flexible Response should contain at the outset 
an unqualified renunciation of reliance on the strategy of Massive Retaliation. It 
should be made clear that the United States will prepare itself to respond 
anywhere, any-time, with weapons and forces appropriate to the situation. Thus, 
we would restore to warfare its historic justification as a means to create a better 
world upon the successful conclusion of hostilities.23 
 
Taylor laid out how the United States and its western allies would benefit from the change in 
doctrine. When elected in 1960, President John F. Kennedy agreed with Taylor’s assessment and 
saw in him the strategic mind he wanted leading the nation’s armed forces as Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. With Flexible Response being the new strategy of the United States, the 
NATO military command eventually adopted a solution of ground forces in a Forward Defense 
 
21 Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, 1st ed. (New York: Harper, 1960), 4. 
22 Ibid., 5. 
23 Ibid., 146. 
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of the Inter-German border, albeit not without some hesitation on the part of those who doubted 
the ability of NATO ground forces to halt a Soviet offensive.24  
 The Kennedy administration committed the United States to the Forward Defense of 
West Germany.25 Now that Flexible Response demanded a commitment to conventional forces, 
an adequate defense force would have to remain ready for battle, and rapid response forces 
would have to quickly deploy to reinforce the front in Germany. This need for a rapid response 
force was the origin of the REFORGER exercises, and although the first REFORGER was not 
conducted until 1969, it was clear that the United States was veering away from massive 
retaliation in favor of a more measured and less destructive approach, thereby necessitating rapid 
and massive deployment of conventional forces to Europe in event of war.  
 The necessity of forces in a forward defensive posture was a major factor in the creation 
of the REFORGER exercises, but the goal of Forward Defense was achievable only with a 
standing army in Germany, begging the question of why the United States redeployed more than 
34,000 troops from Germany back to the United States in 1967. Congressional calls for force 
reductions in Europe in response to the cost of maintaining troops along the Inter-German border 
and the fiscal requirements of the ongoing Vietnam War necessitated this redeployment.26 
Archival documents show that the United States’ NATO allies had concerns in 1969 about the 
U.S. commitment to Western European defense; these documents also suggest that these 
concerns date back to the original congressionally mandated force reductions in 1967.27 
 
24 Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army, 44. 
25 Ibid., 60. 
26 Ibid., 185. 
27 AmEmbassy Rome to USCINCEUR, USMISSION NATO, and CINCUSAREUR BONN, “REFORGER I: Italian 
Press Treatment: Two Critical Articles,” REFORGER Regional 1969, Entry P447, Box 117, RG 306, NARA II. 
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 The 1967 trilateral agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the 
Federal Republic of Germany assuaged any concerns of U.S. commitment, for the time being at 
least. The United States would assign the 24th Infantry Division to the defense of Western 
Europe, with one reinforced brigade stationed in Germany and the rest of the division stationed 
in the United States. Troops based in the United States would maintain a high degree of 
readiness and would be prepared to deploy to Germany in fewer than thirty days. The equipment 
for the entire division would remain in Germany at POMCUS (Pre-Positioning Of Materiel 
Configured in Unit Sets) sites. Once a year, the U.S. based brigades would redeploy to Germany, 
draw their equipment from the POMCUS sites, and take part in an exercise to determine the 
ability and readiness of the division to deploy and defend Western Europe when necessary. The 
brigade based in Germany the previous year would rotate back to the United States, and a 
recently deployed brigade would remain on the line of Forward Defense.28 This agreement led to 
the first REFORGER exercise and created the main tool for the conventional defense of Western 
Europe. REFORGER would grow to become a pivotal part of the U.S. military commitment to 
NATO.  
Historiography and Methodology 
 Historians and military analysts have written about the REFORGER exercises on 
numerous occasions; however, the focus is always on REFORGER as another example of U.S. 
deployment capability, evolution of the Cold War Army, the necessity of Western European 
defense, or, in some cases, magnified views of individual exercises that were more impactful 
than others. There does not seem to be any secondary sources that focus on the importance of the 
 
28 “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region - Office of the 
Historian,” accessed July 25, 2020, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v13/d249. 
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REFORGER exercises as a series of events, or as a key influencer in the U.S./NATO diplomatic 
relationship.  
 Historian Ingo Trauschweizer, in The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for 
Limited War, writes about the REFORGER exercises in the context of evolving post World War 
II military doctrine and the changing of emphasis away from Mutually Assured [nuclear] 
Destruction in the 1950s to the need for conventional defense forces. Trauschweizer writes, 
“Robert McNamara, who championed the REFORGER Plan, nevertheless hoped that reliance on 
the strategic and theater nuclear deterrents could be minimized.”29 His analysis of the doctrinal 
origins of REFORGER are extensive, but his writing does not show the diplomatic influencers 
for the exercises, which was to convince Western Europe and NATO of the U.S. commitment to 
defense against the growing Soviet threat. Trauschweizer goes on to stress the importance of 
maintaining a conventional warfighting capability against the Soviet Union to avoid the dangers 
of a nuclear war, but he does not go into detail on how the REFORGER exercises were 
conducted from an operational or tactical level.30 
 The only other significant text that analyzes the REFORGER exercises is Able Archer 
83: The Secret History of the NATO Exercise that Almost Triggered Nuclear War, by Nate Jones. 
This book illustrates how a large-scale NATO exercise in 1983, dubbed Autumn Forge, had the 
Soviets convinced that the United States and NATO were preparing for a nuclear strike against 
the USSR. Jones writes that, “The largest of these exercises was known as REFORGER 83 
which occurred during the final phases of Autumn Forge; it included a momentous ‘show of 
resolve’ in the face of a hypothetical Soviet invasion, airlifting 19,000 troops and 1,500 tons of 
 
29 Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army, 186. 
30 Ibid., 193. 
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cargo from the United States to Europe to simulate a response to a conventional war.”31 Jones 
fails to mention that the United States and NATO conducted these exercises for thirteen years 
prior to Autumn Forge and was already adept at this large scale redeployment of forces. 
Nevertheless, REFORGER 83 was an outlier in the series of exercises, in that it was almost a 
Cuban Missile Crisis of the 1980s.  
 The remainder of secondary sources that mention the REFORGER exercises are written 
by a handful of military analysts who look at REFORGER as an example of countering Russian 
aggression in the Cold War and how something similar could be used to counter the geo-political 
threat of a modern Russia. A good example of this is Permanent Deterrence: The US and NATO 
Response by Former Deputy Secretary General of NATO Alexander Vershbow and Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe Philip M. Breedlove. The report shows the NATO and U.S. Force 
posture in Europe prior to 2014 and mentions the importance of REFORGER in a defense 
posture during the Cold War.32  
 The coverage and writing on REFORGER uses the exercises as just one example in the 
larger context of the Cold War and European defense. The lack of context necessitates a deeper 
analysis into the diplomatic origins of the exercises, along with an analysis of the evolving 
logistic network that facilitated the ever-growing exercises. This thesis aims to fill this gap in the 
historical narrative and uses a mix of archival sources gathered from the National Archives II in 
College Park, Maryland; the archives at the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center in 
Carlisle, Pennsylvania; and the NATO online archives. Some of the primary source documents 
were previously classified and were provided for use in research under the Freedom of 
 
31 Jones, Able Archer 83, 25. 
32 Alexander R. Vershbow and Philip M. Breedlove, “The U.S. and NATO Response, Permanent Deterrence" 
(Atlantic Council, 2019), 23, JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep20950.8. 
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Information Act. I have used secondary sources to gather and provide background information 
on the context of REFORGER within the Cold War. I also conducted interviews to provide a 
personal understanding of the REFORGER exercises from the perspective of U.S. military 
personnel who took part in various individual exercises.  
The Diplomacy of REFORGER 
 The U.S.-NATO alliance was one born out of necessity. During World War II, the United 
States and Great Britain came together to combat a common enemy, one whose values were 
antithetical to liberal democracy. The establishment of NATO in 1949 can be seen as the 
culmination and formalization of this wartime alliance. Western nations united to deter another 
common enemy, one whose threatened expansion jeopardized Western Europe. This does not 
mean, however, that the alliance between these nations was without flaw. Many Western 
European states doubted the United States’ commitment to European defense and became fearful 
of their ability to defend Europe should the Soviets choose to expand west.33 As was mentioned 
in the introduction, no historian has ever analyzed the impact of REFORGER on the diplomatic 
relationship between the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Nor has any 
historian viewed REFORGER as a tool to better relations between the U.S. and NATO. This 
section will not only present the origins of REFORGER as a diplomatic exercise, but it will 
argue that concerns of U.S. commitment were prevalent throughout much of the Cold War, and 
that the exercises were viewed as fundamental to U.S.-NATO diplomatic relations during this 
period.  
 
33 AmEmbassy Rome to USCINCEUR, USMISSION NATO, and CINCUSAREUR BONN, “REFORGER I: Italian 
Press Treatment: Two Critical Articles,” REFORGER Regional 1969, Entry P447, Box 117, RG 306, NARA II. 
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 The commitment of annually redeployed forces from the United States to West Germany 
began with a series of trilateral talks between the United States, United Kingdom, and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Georg Duckwitz, Head of the Eastern Department in the German 
Foreign Ministry, John McCloy, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, and George 
Thomson, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth affairs met from October 1966 to 
April 1967 to determine strategies, forces, aid, and procedures for the NATO alliance. Among 
these strategies presented, the talks created a detailed plan for the defense of Western Europe 
against Soviet aggression. This evolved into the series of REFORGER exercises that continued 
until 1993.34  
 According to the Trilateral Agreement, the United States would withdraw up to 35,000 
military personnel from Europe, but would ensure that the units remained committed to NATO.35 
I n the case of the 24th Infantry Division, this meant that one brigade would remain in West 
Germany while the remainder of the division moved back to the United States.36 REFORGER 
was essential to practice the redeployment of 24th Infantry Division troops from the United States 
to the FRG to minimize their response time in an emergency. The goal was to respond to Soviet 
aggression with full deployment in less than thirty days. This number grew to include multiple 
divisions as the REFORGER exercises evolved. This redeployment of forces was necessary to 
maintain the defenses of Western Europe, but documents suggest that congressional budgetary 
restrictions concerned NATO allies and annual redeployment of forces alleviated these concerns.  
 
34 “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region - Office of the 
Historian.” 
35 “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region - Office of the 




 According to a classified telegram from Secretary of State William Rogers to American 
Ambassador to NATO Robert Ellsworth, “The budget reductions caused a delay in submission of 
our 1969 DPQ [Defense Planning Questionnaire, JR] reply and this tardiness has fed European 
concerns about future U.S.-NATO commitments.”37  While this document is from a communique 
dated two years after the trilateral talks, it alludes to continuing concerns of NATO allies 
regarding the U.S. commitment. Moreover, an executive background paper for the Special 
Session of the North Atlantic Council in November 1969 states that, “Our NATO Allies have 
recently been more uneasy than usual about possible U.S. force reduction in Europe.”38 These 
concerns came from Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield’s proposed force reductions in 
Europe, and it became the job of U.S. ambassadors and presidents alike to assure NATO allies of 
the U.S. commitment, despite continued threats of budget cuts from Congress.  
 Concerns regarding the U.S. commitment to NATO were prevalent throughout the Cold 
War due to belt-tightening in Congress. A telegram When? from Acting Secretary of State 
Charles W. Robinson to the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, George Mahon, 
perfectly explains the concerns of the United States’ NATO allies and the importance of 
REFORGER for the Alliance as well as for the defense of Western Europe:  
I have learned of the pending proposal before your committee to discontinue 
funding for the REFORGER and CRESTED CAP strategic mobility exercises. In 
our view, this would have a serious and detrimental impact not only on our future 
military capability to reinforce Europe, but also on the integrity of our NATO 
commitments. It is a matter of special sensitivity to the West Germans and the 
British because of our 1967 Trilateral agreement under which we agreed to return 
U.S.-based forces to Germany annually. I understand Secretary Rumsfeld has 
solicited your support in this matter and I join him in strongly urging that you 
 
37 SECSTATE WASHDC to ANATO, “U.S. Force Commitments to NATO and U.S. Reply to DPQ 1969,” October, 
1969, REFORGER Regional 1969, Entry P447, Box 117, RG 306, NARA II.  
38 Special Session of the North Atlantic Council, November 5-6, 1969. “Background Paper, U.S. Troops in Europe,” 
October 28, 1969, REFORGER Regional 1969, Entry P447, Box 117, RG 306 NARA II. 
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give most careful consideration to this militarily and politically significant aspect 
of our government’s contribution to NATO and Western European defense.39 
 
The telegram, dated in 1976, shows that members of several executive administrations during the 
Cold War era understood the importance of REFORGER in not only maintaining the military 
defensive posture in Western Europe, but also in maintaining good relations with Western allies, 
principally the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. The presidents and their 
appointees were not, however, the only U.S. officials to understand the importance of 
REFORGER to the diplomatic and military relationship with Western Europe. 
  Considering that the United States military planned, executed, and evolved the 
REFORGER exercises, it stands to reason that military leaders would be aware of the exercises’ 
main goals. Archival documents indicate that those military leaders in charge of the exercises 
were not only aware of the diplomatic mission, but actively changed which units would be 
deployed in various European exercises in an attempt to preserve it.   
 Primary documents from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Central Files, at NARA II, 
describe in detail the planning, funding, goals, and execution of the REFORGER Exercises. The 
common theme in these JCS files are difficulties with the provided congressional funding in 
maintaining military readiness for dual-based units.40 Cuts to funding limited the ability of the 
United States to deploy forces to Germany when needed. It has already been shown that these 
limits to funding caused concern among the NATO allies, and these documents suggest that U.S. 
military leaders were aware of the importance of these exercises in maintaining the Alliance.  
 
39 George W. Robinson, “Letter to Chairman of House Appropriations Committee George Mahon,” June 7, 1976, 
P760085-0779, Entry P455, RG 59, NARA II. 
40 Report by the J-3 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “JCS-Directed Exercise Schedule,” March 23, 1970, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Official Record, Box 40, JCS Central Files, Decimal 385, RG 218, NARA II. 
19 
 
 The main issue in 1970 was the lack of funding to deploy the 3rd Squadron, 3rd Armored 
Cavalry Regiment during REFORGER II. While this squadron was an essential part of the dual-
based forces, the JCS realized that deleting the unit from REFORGER II would allow the series 
of REFORGER exercises to continue. Moreover, the JCS were aware of the 1967 trilateral 
agreement and were clear that this slight reduction of forces did not violate it, but instead 
ensured that it was upheld. A JCS memo sent to the Secretary of Defense stated,  “The deletion 
of the 3d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, from the Exercise REFORGER II troop list 
presents no difficulty under the terms of the 1967 Trilateral Agreements.”41 This shows an 
awareness among military leaders of the diplomatic agreement between the United States and its 
NATO allies, supporting the claim that the military exercise of redeploying troops from the 
United States to Germany was a well-established diplomatic tool.  
 This series of documents from the JCS also showed a continued emphasis on the 
REFORGER and CRESTED CAP exercises, the latter being the air force portion of the annual 
redeployment exercises, and how reduced funding would not impact these exercises even as it 
caused the cancellation of others:  
The JCS Exercise Program has been operating at a reduced level of funding for 
the past few years… . Under the limited program, large-scale joint exercises 
(other than REFORGER and CRESTED CAP) designed to test strategic mobility 
concepts or to develop proficiency in joint operations either have to be cancelled 
or held at a reduced scope.42 
 
While other military exercises were being scaled back or cancelled, the REFORGER and 
CRESTED CAP exercises were prioritized to continue. This proves that REFORGER was 
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considered essential to the mission of Western European defense. REFORGER, and its air force 
equivalent, were the sole exercises important enough to survive budget cuts, and this was due to 
the importance of the U.S.-NATO diplomatic relationship.  
 This focus on a NATO commitment continued throughout the REFORGER exercises, 
and military leaders’ awareness of this commitment is evident as well. The Final After Action 
Report for REFORGER III, conducted in 1972, describes all action that was taken in the exercise 
from the redeployment of troops to Germany from the United States, to the Field Training 
Exercises (FTX) conducted, and the objectives of the exercise. The commander’s comments 
states, “The value of Exercise REFORGER III cannot be overemphasized. The REFORGER 
series of exercises have significantly increased our ability to rapidly and effectively augment our 
European forces in fulfillment of our commitment to NATO.”43 This shows an institutional 
awareness of the U.S. commitment to NATO and the importance of REFORGER in maintaining 
the alliance. A similar statement of NATO commitment can be seen in the Final After-Action 
Report from REFORGER 79: Certain Sentinel. The third exercise objective, out of fifteen, in this 
report is, “To demonstrate U.S. Resolve to defend Europe and honor North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) commitments.”44 This means that reinforcing the NATO commitment was 
clearly considered to be essential to REFORGER exercises, and all available documents suggest 
that this commitment did not weaken over time. 
 Unfortunately, research conducted at the National Archives II and the U.S. Army 
Heritage Education Center Archives did not yield any primary source information for the later 
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years of REFORGER. The latest available source is the after-action report for REFORGER 85: 
Central Guardian. This report lists five main objectives for REFORGER 85: Strengthen NATO, 
Train Realistically, Minimize Maneuver Damage, Enhance Good Will, and Emphasize Safety.45 
While the after-action reports for REFORGERs 86-93 are still classified with whereabouts 
unknown, the report from REFORGER 85 shows that the U.S. armed forces had institutionalized 
the strengthening of the NATO alliance and normalized the use of REFORGER as the main tool 
to fulfill that objective. From the president down to the military commanders who were running 
the FTXs, REFORGER was seen as pivotal to the military and diplomatic relationship between 
the United States and NATO. However, awareness and dissemination of this REFORGER 
objective was much more widespread. 
  The early years showed an acknowledgment of importance from the president, 
presidential appointees, and high-ranking military leaders; however, as the exercise progressed 
and evolved, the importance was quickly disseminated on a broad level. An article titled, 
“REFORGER III Fulfills NATO Pledge” from Armor: the Magazine of Mobile Warfare, written 
by Lieutenant Colonel Warren W. Lennon, explains the origins of the REFORGER exercises, 
how REFORGER III would be conducted, and what units would take part. This is the first 
indication that REFORGER was marketed to the participating soldiers as a mission with the goal 
of meeting the NATO commitments made in 1967.46 Considering that a number of soldiers 
participating in REFORGER would have read this, it is clear that the exercises as a tool for 
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diplomacy as well as for military effectiveness was well known. This dissemination of 
REFORGER diplomatic objectives continued into the later years of the exercises. 
 The 1985 issue of Translog: The Official Magazine of the Military Traffic Management 
Command, opens with an article title, “Why REFORGER,” by Major Charles Rosenblum. In this 
article Major Rosenblum explains that, “The United States is committed to the annual REturn of 
FORces to GERmany to fulfill our 1967 NATO agreement.”47 While the REFORGER exercise 
had evolved to include six infantry divisions, two armored brigades, and one light infantry 
brigade from the Tennessee National Guard, it was clear that the purpose of REFORGER did not 
change along with its scale. Major Rosenblum goes on to say that, “Without the exercise we 
would lose the opportunity to train our troops in a joint venture, we would miss the chance to test 
new and innovative systems in a realistic environment, and we would fail to fulfill our NATO 
commitment.”48 Not only was the diplomatic commitment to NATO listed as among the top 
three benefits of REFORGER, but the threat of Soviet expansion is no longer mentioned. The 
exercises had fully evolved into a practice to aid the modernization of rapid response forces, but 
most importantly, as a tool to preserve diplomatic relations with Western Europe even as the fear 
of an expansionist Soviet Union diminished.  
 The objective of REFORGER as a diplomatic tool was clearly available throughout the 
series of exercises, but it is important to understand how soldiers involved viewed the exercises 
and if they were aware of the diplomatic aspect of REFORGER. Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, U.S. 
Army retired, participated in various capacities in REFORGERs 83, 87, 88, and 90. Serving as a 
tank platoon leader in the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment out of Fort Bliss, Texas, Mansoor, a 
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Second Lieutenant at the time, explained how he experienced the exercise. He stated that, “The 
blocking and tackling of tactics in REFORGER was useless, but in terms of maneuvering at a 
higher level, the operational level of war, and exercising logistical systems it was fantastic.”49 
While the operational and logistical aspect of the exercises will be covered later in this thesis, it 
is important to note that the tactical portion of the exercise was not of great value to the units 
involved. This, along with previous evidence, suggests that the purpose of REFORGER was not 
tactical preparation for a Soviet invasion, but part of a diplomatic outreach with Western Europe. 
Moreover, when asked if there was an awareness of the diplomatic mission, Colonel Mansoor 
stated that, as a soldier, “You had a vague idea of what was happening at echelons beyond 
reality, but we were pretty much focused on our military mission.”50 Therefore, while there was 
clearly available information on REFORGER’s diplomatic purpose, during the exercises U.S. 
forces focused on the task at hand. However, that does not mean that the diplomatic mission was 
not undertaken at a tactical level; it was instead more personalized and archival documents 
suggest that this personalization was an intentional aspect on the part of senior military leaders. 
 An essential aspect of diplomacy is direct contact between the peoples of two allied 
nations. In REFORGER, Colonel Mansoor explained several ways in which the United States 
would communicate and interact with various locals. First, while conducting the tactical portion 
of the exercises, the U.S. units would drive through fields, roads, farms, and other property, 
sometimes causing maneuver damage. The United States would then dispatch personnel to 
compensate the locals for their destroyed property, often for a greater amount than the value of 
the property itself. This led to positive views of the United States with German property 
 




owners.51 Moreover, after completing the Field Training Exercise (FTX) of REFORGER 83, 
Colonel Mansoor explained that his platoon was selected to join the German 134th Panzer 
Battalion for gunnery training. This, along with the expected evening socialization, allowed the 
forces from both sides to interact, thus increasing the bond between the U.S. troops and their 
German allies.52 This suggests that military command was aware of the necessity for cooperation 
on all levels to ensure a healthy diplomatic relationship. This was cooperation was not, however, 
only targeted to military personnel. 
 Throughout the REFORGER exercises and especially in the inaugural REFORGER in 
1969, there was a targeted media campaign from United States European Command (U.S.-
EUCOM) that was intended to spread the word of REFORGER to citizens of the United States 
and Germany. An article from the U.S. Army Command Information Unit depicts various photos 
from the first REFORGER exercise and was used to present the exercise as a diplomatic victory 
to the public. “In 1969, the United States, with the agreement of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, decided to send 35,000 U.S. Army and Air Force military personnel to alternate 
bases in the United States, where they would remain committed to NATO.”53 While the article 
depicted the redeployment of troops back to alternate bases in the United States as beneficial to 
diplomacy, it did not explain why this diplomatic measure was necessary. There were issues of 
financing 35,000 troops on the Intra-German border, and this redeployment to the United States 
would serve as a cost-saving measure. However, with the troops still committed to NATO 
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troops to rehearse a rapid deployment should it have proven necessary, as well as maintaining the 
diplomatic commitment made in the 1967 trilateral agreement.  
 The article described various aspects of REFORGER I, from the military commanders 
charting out the plan to the drawing of equipment from the POMCUS sites. This was clearly an 
attempt to show the American people the importance of REFORGER and was used to ensure that 
the exercises continued without detrimental cuts to funding. If the people believed that the 
exercises were necessary, then they would be continued. Therefore, the dissemination of this 
information to the American people was done in an effort to bolster the diplomatic relationship 
between the United States and NATO.  
 In the REFORGER Regional 1969 files at National Archives II, there were fifteen U.S.-
EUCOM press releases describing the REFORGER I FTX, the gathering of equipment from 
POMCUS sites, the simultaneous Air Force exercise, and all aspects regarding this logistical and 
military operation. While clearly this publicity presented the picture of a strong defense against 
the Soviet Union, it also showed the importance of the exercises on a public level, thereby 
strengthening the connection between the people of the United States and Europe and building 
the diplomatic relationship through that connection. 
 The REFORGER exercises were military exercises with a clear military purpose. 
However, to ignore the diplomatic impact, intention, and origin of the exercises would leave a 
gap in the history of NATO during the Cold War. At a time when funding for military exercises 
was being cut, REFORGER alone survived, because it was seen as essential to the relationship 
between the United States and its Western European allies. These exercises, conducted over the 
course of twenty-four years, served as a foundation of diplomacy between the western 
industrialized nations. The remainder of this thesis will cover the military aspects of the 
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exercises; however, no aspect of the REdeployment of FORces to GERmany was more important 
than their diplomatic purpose.  
REFORGER and Cold War Military Strategy 
 REFORGER was part of the larger context of Cold War military strategy. US presidents 
from Harry S. Truman to George. H.W. Bush all believed that it was an essential duty of the 
United States to defend Western Europe from the Soviet threat. Containment was U.S. policy 
throughout the Cold War, but the plans to fulfill that policy goal evolved. The Truman 
administration focused on the establishment of NATO and using the might of the American 
economy to support and bolster Western Europe. The Eisenhower administration established 
nuclear first strike policies under the guise of Massive Retaliation, and the Kennedy 
Administration adopted the strategy of Flexible Response originating in General Maxwell 
Taylor’s book The Uncertain Trumpet. As noted earlier the perils of Massive Retaliation led to 
the policy of Flexible Response; however, a deeper explanation of this strategy’s adoption and its 
relationship with REFORGER is necessary.  
 Taylor argued that nuclear strikes would result in mass casualties on both sides of a 
potential European conflict. As Exercise Carte Blanche established, nuclear strikes would lead to 
the destruction of much of Western Europe, which was antithetical to the mission of defending 
NATO territory. Taylor therefore determined that a new strategy, one geared away from nuclear 
arsenals, was needed to attain alliance goals. Taylor first compiled the forces available to fulfill 
the ends of his proposed strategy. The United States, Western Europe, Iran, the Republic of 
Korea, Japan, Chinese Nationalists, and South Vietnam had nearly 157 million military age men 
that could be called upon to fight, compared to only 145 million for the Soviet bloc, giving the 
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West a slight numerical advantage.54 This calculus suggested that a strategy based on 
conventional warfare and manpower could succeed, provided the military improved planning, 
equipping, and training for conventional conflict.55 Taylor viewed Flexible Response as a way in 
which the United States could respond to Soviet threats and expansion without the immediate use 
of nuclear weaponry. The Kennedy administration adopted this idea as policy. 
 In his 1956 “America’s Stake in Vietnam” speech, then Senator Kennedy stated that 
“Atomic superiority and the development of new ultimate weapons were not enough [to contain 
communism].”56 Kennedy’s appointment of Taylor as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
shows that his negative view of nuclear first-use did not diminish with his ascension to the 
presidency. To operationalize this policy, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara moved towards 
enhancing “the armed forces’ ability to move and fight without nuclear weapons.”57 While the 
strategy was sound, President Kennedy understood that nuclear armageddon was still possible 
and took actions to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Historian Allan R. Millett and colleagues 
write:  
The Kennedy administration also had to face the unpleasant reality that no easy 
technical solution would eliminate the risk of nuclear war. Kennedy adopted 
Eisenhower’s negotiations for arms control, especially to limit nuclear testing. In 
October 1963 the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed to 
conduct nuclear tests only underground. For the first time in the Nuclear age, 
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Flexible response, along with continuing negotiations for arms reduction, limited the threat of 
nuclear annihilation. The next step was to create a theater strategy for NATO to defend Western 
Europe against communist expansion. 
 Parity issues between NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces, theater nuclear 
weapons, and strategic nuclear weapons all influenced the ongoing strategic debate. Nuclear 
weapons seemingly provided an inexpensive way of defending NATO from a Soviet attack. 
Furthermore, if the conventional forces required to defend the eastern border of West Germany 
did not exist, then a strategy of Forward Defense was infeasible.59 In this regard, Warsaw Pact 
forces and materiel outnumbered NATO throughout the Cold War.  
 Alliance leaders eventually settled on a strategy of Forward Defense to protect Western 
Europe from a Soviet attack. This strategy was not, however, originally constructed to meet the 
goals of Flexible Response, but was instead part of a longstanding debate among alliance 
military and strategic planners. In an article published in the 1985 issue of Parameters, historian 
James Blackwell argues that NATO Forward Defense strategy first appeared in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II. In 1946, Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, commander of British 
Occupation Forces in West Germany, submitted a proposal in his role as Chief of the Imperial 
Staff that argued for a conventional defense of the European Continent with a combination of 
British and allied forces. The British Ministry of Defense rejected this proposal in 1947, instead 
advocating for airpower that would weaken an invading Soviet force, even if it meant 
surrendering Western European territory.60 Blackwell writes that, in his reply to the Ministry of 
 
59 Lieutenant Colonel Waldo D. Freeman Jr., “NATO Central Region Forward Defense: Correcting the 
Strategy/Force Mismatch,” National Security Affairs Issue Paper Series 81-3, 1981, 1. 
60 James A. Blackwell, Jr., “In the Laps of the Gods: The Origins of NATO Forward Defense,” Parameters, Journal 
of the U.S. Army Wat College 15, no. 4 (1985): 65, 
29 
 
Defense, Montgomery “Not only reiterated his argument for a conventional land defense, he also 
proposed his formula for effecting his strategy” and that, “This is the earliest public record of an 
official postwar reference to a Forward Defense of Europe. Thus, at the operational level of war, 
Montgomery should be credited with being a fundamental proponent of Forward Defense.”61 
 Montgomery was appointed the Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief committee and 
after vigorous debate between the British and French, it was agreed that they would create a line 
of Forward Defense as far from French territory as possible. Furthermore, the United States 
committed to the strategy of Forward Defense of Western Europe with the establishment of 
NATO in 1949.62 This does not mean, however, that the debate on European defense had 
subsided; in fact, the agreement on Forward Defense shifted the debate to the implementation of 
the strategy. While Taylor accurately accessed the troop numbers of Allied and Soviet Bloc 
forces in 1959, NATO strategists were faced with a military imbalance in Central Europe in the 
early 1950s that posed a serious threat to the alliance. In the early 1950s, NATO fielded 35 
brigades, or roughly 125,000 troops, for the defense of Central Europe, compared with the Soviet 
Union fielding nearly three times as many in the region.63 
  NATO approved the strategy of Forward Defense at the Council of Lisbon in February of 
1952.64 This approval sparked another debate between western military strategists: whether the 
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 A mobile defense, which the British suggested, would have allowed NATO forces to 
reduce the numbers of Soviet invaders through delaying tactics, and to make a stand at the Rhine 
River against a weakened force, thus negating the lack of parity in conventional forces. The 
French, represented by General De Lattre de Tassigny, advocated for a positional defense closer 
to the Intra-German border and farther from the French frontier.65 This would have ensured that 
French territory was farther from the front lines. However, a Forward Defense at the Intra-
German border would have been difficult to conduct without German forces, so the United States 
began advocating for the rearming of West Germany to allow it to participate in Western 
European defense.66 The French were vehemently opposed to this plan out of a fear of future 
German belligerency.67 Moreover, Charles DeGaulle, a French nationalist, contended that the 
United States did not intend to defend the European continent, but instead used the delaying 
tactic as “cover for another Dunkirk-style evacuation.”68  
 French fear of waning U.S. commitment came from the Pleven Plan, later renamed the 
European Defense Community (EDC), which called for a single European army that all signatory 
nations would have a say in directing. The plan would allow for West-German participation but 
would forbid West Germany from having a national army. The EDC found little backing in 
Europe, but the U.S. and West Germany supported it because each nation believed German 
participation was essential to Forward Defense. The EDC was drafted in the spring of 1952, but 
several nations failed to ratify, including the French, because there was no outright commitment 
of the United States and United Kingdom to provide forces in the defense of the European 
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continent.69 These concerns were alleviated with the establishment of the Western European 
Union (WEU), which gave France the guarantees it needed of U.S. and British commitment to 
European defense.  
 The French were not alone, however, in their advocacy for a positional defense. The 
West Germany Social Democratic Party had concerns that the allies would not rearm West 
Germany, and the state would be left defenseless in the wake of a Soviet Invasion. The WEU 
alleviated these concerns as well, because it granted West Germany sovereignty, ended the 
French, British, and U.S. occupation, and allowed for the rearming of West Germany. German 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer recognized that the Rhine defense would sacrifice valuable 
territory and argued for a positional Forward Defense beginning at the Inter-German border.70 
With the participation of West Germany in European defense, the available forces for defense 
doubled, and NATO forces could now cover the entire European front.71 
 While NATO reached agreement on a positional defense, the United States did not yet 
abandon massive nuclear retaliation because while the forces were available, their readiness was 
still low. However, the adoption of Flexible Response allowed NATO to implement the strategy 
of Forward Defense that was crafted in the early 1950s.  
 The addition of forces from Germany allowed NATO to defend the entire eastern border 
of West Germany. The WEU provided additional forces from other member nations, notably the 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Belgium. The Dutch, West Germans, British, and Belgian 
forces each provided a corps for the Northern Army Group, which defended the North German 
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Plain. West Germany and the United States each provided two corps for the Central Army Group 
in the Fulda Gap and further south.72 France declined to participate in this Forward Defense. 
While the French ratified the WEU agreement, French President Charles de Gaulle announced on 
21 February 1966 that all French troops would pull out of Germany.73 While this was a shock to 
Allied forces, Geary argues that “The French attitude was known for quite some time.”74 This 
required that the United States commit a larger number of forces and increase its responsibility 
as a main defender of the European continent.75 This larger responsibility led to grave concerns 
among the United States’ European allies when congressional budget cuts called for force 
reductions in Germany, concerns that were later alleviated with the implementation of 
REFORGER. 
 A larger U.S. commitment to Europe was difficult given the fiscal realities. As the 
Vietnam War placed an enormous financial burden on the United States, congressional 
budgetary restrictions forced the Defense Department to reduce the number of standing troops in 
Germany by two brigades.76 The plan was to consider the troops in these brigades as units 
assigned to United States Army Europe (USAREUR), while stationing them in the United States. 
Trauschweizer writes that, “This was essentially an accounting measure which withdrew 34,000 
combat and support troops, while leaving them on the books. USAREUR commanders expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the solution and pointed out that it made no sense to count units that 
were not actually present in Europe.”77 If the goal of a Forward Defense is to ensure that an 
invading force does not penetrate deeply into allied territory, and the way to hold a forward line 
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is with an abundance of troops, then force reductions of 34,000 combat and support troops 
essentially left Western Europe poorly defended against a potential Soviet invasion, which 
caused grave concerns among the United States’ European allies. Military planners had to craft a 
strategy that would allow for the defense of Western Europe without unduly depleting the U.S. 
military budget or abandoning any West German Territory. The answer was REFORGER. 
 At the Trilateral Talks, the NATO allies agreed that one brigade of the 24th Infantry 
Division, along with that brigade’s support troops, would remain stationed at the Inter-German 
border. The two other brigades would redeploy back to the United States and remain on-call if 
the Soviet Union attempted an invasion.78 In the case of a Soviet attack, the two U.S. based 
brigades would redeploy back to Germany to aid in the defense of Western Europe, and the 
German based brigade would serve as an initial defense force. This is called dual-basing:  when a 
military unit, in this case the 24th Infantry Division, is assigned to one area, U.S. Army Europe, 
but separately housed at different bases. This dual-basing allowed the Department of Defense to 
allocate resources to the ongoing Vietnam War and still maintain that they were prepared and 
ready to defend Europe from the Soviet Union. However, the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the United Kingdom determined that designating these forces to Western European defense was 
not enough, and the United States committed to conducting an annual exercise to rehearse the 
redeployment of forces, which proved to be a monumental logistical challenge and feat.  
 The logistical planning and execution of the REFORGER exercises will be covered in the 
next section; however, it is important to note that establishing the REFORGER exercises proved 
the U.S. commitment to avoid nuclear war. REFORGER was a military necessity in the latter 
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years of the Cold War because it allowed the United States and Western Europe to maintain the 
strategy of Flexible Response through the devoted training of conventional forces to conduct a 
limited war, therefore ensuring that a potential Soviet invasion would not lead to global 
catastrophe.    
The Execution of REFORGER  
 Understanding the context and nuance of Cold War diplomacy and military strategy is 
only a fraction of the history related to the REFORGER exercises. The last section of this thesis 
will cover earlier rapid deployment exercises that allowed REFORGER to be successful, the 
logistical network that provided the needed materiel for redeployed troops, the details of 
Exercise REFORGER I at an operational level, and small unit tactics employed in a Field 
Training Exercise (FTX).   
 Analyzing the conduct and logistics of the REFORGER exercises makes clear how large 
a feat it was to rapidly deploy forces from the United States to Europe with adequate combat 
troops, support personnel, needed materiel, and proper transportation. While the REFORGER 
series was indeed the longest running in Department of Defense history, it was not the first of the 
large-scale rapid deployment exercises undertaken by the United States. REFORGER I in 
January 1969 drew on established methods and procedures from another exercise conducted in 
October 1963, Operation BIG LIFT. Much like REFORGER, the purpose of BIG LIFT was to 
prepare for the rapid reinforcement of NATO, “To stem a likely attack by Warsaw Pact forces in 
West Germany.”79  
 




 During Operation BIG LIFT, soldiers from the 2nd Armored Division at Fort Hood, 
Texas, assembled and boarded flights bound for the line of Forward Defense in West Germany. 
After nearly three days and 200 flights, 15,000 troops from the 2nd Armored Division, two 
additional artillery battalions, and various transportation units arrived in Germany. After arrival, 
the combat troops collected equipment from various depots. This allowed the units to limit the 
amount of materiel they needed to transport from Fort Hood to Germany, thus avoiding a 
logistical nightmare and providing a contingency plan if another supply chain crisis, similar to 
the Berlin Crisis of 1961, limited the ability of troops to transport goods.80  
 After collecting their needed materiel, the 2nd Armored Division joined the Seventh U.S. 
Army stationed in Europe and took part in an FTX that simulated a battle along the border 
between East and West Germany. “Altogether, nearly 46,000 personnel, 900 tanks, and hundreds 
of trucks and armored personnel carriers participated. The Air Force flew 759 sorties in support 
as well.”81 This exercise was the first of its size and nature in Central Europe and ended with the 
umpires declaring the Blue (Allied) forces victorious, with the Orange (Enemy) forces having 
been defeated in tactical maneuvers. While the tactical aspects of the exercise were arguably 
only marginally beneficial, the true benefit of BIG LIFT was the opportunity it presented to the 
U.S. Army VII Corps, which conducted a command post exercise in conjunction with the FTX. 
This simulated the actions the VII Corps would take in the case of a Soviet invasion and helped 
allied forces on an operational and strategic level.82  
 BIG LIFT was considered successful because the United States was able to deploy a large 







in an FTX that simulated a Central European conventional land battle. Not all, however, agreed 
that BIG LIFT was as successful as some leaders, like President Kennedy, believed. Much of the 
collected equipment was faulty and outdated, meaning that the materiel was below the required 
standard. The units involved were augmented prior to deployment, therefore artificially 
enhancing the readiness of various Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF). The cost of the exercise was 
more than twice what was originally planned, showing that these exercises were not as cost 
effective as congressional budgeters were led to believe.83 While operation BIG LIFT was an 
imperfect exercise, it provided the United States and NATO with a template of lessons to draw 
from when conducting large-scale exercises that prepared for the defense of Western Europe.  
 BIG LIFT was not, however, the only precursor to REFORGER. On 30 December 1964, 
a memorandum regarding STRIKE Command Operational Plan 629 (OPLAN 629), was sent out 
to commanders of more than ten agencies within the United States Army. STRIKE, standing for 
Swift Tactical Reaction in Every Known Environment, was responsible for maintaining high 
degrees of deployment readiness of forces assigned to the Continental United States. OPLAN 
629 required all divisions in the USARSTRIKE Command to maintain a Divisional Rapid 
Reaction Force (DRRF) and spelled out the procedures to test the capability of each DRRF to 
move from their home station by rail. Operation BIG LIFT did not present any major challenge 
in moving troops from their home stations, but OPLAN 629 provided guidance and support 
which ensured uniformity and success in the initial deployment phases of either exercises or 





possible hot zones requiring DRRF, thus indicating that a plan to standardize deployment was 
needed.84 
 Similar to OPLAN 629, CINCSTRIKE (Commander in Chief Strike Forces) General 
Plan 765, distributed on 1 October 1968, provided a standard for forces participating in rapid 
reaction exercises.85 General Plan 765 reiterated much of the information and guidelines laid out 
in OPLAN 629, but standardized it for USARSTRIKE exercises such as BOLD SHOT, BRIM 
FIRE, BOLD SHOT/BRIM FIRE, and BOXER DRILL. These exercises drilled the techniques 
and procedures that would be necessary for a military deployment. BOLD SHOT involved the 
deployment of a Joint Task Force (JTF), a DRRF, and USAFSTRIKE (United States Air Force 
STRIKE Forces) in a parachute assault of an objective area. BRIM FIRE involved the 
deployment of a JTF, consisting of nonairborne USARSTRIKE and USAFSTRIKE Forces. 
BOLD SHOT/BRIM FIRE was simply a combination of airborne and nonairborne forces in a 
JTF, and BOXER DRILL involved the alerting and planning for the deployment of a JTF at the 
command level.86  
 The remainder of General Plan 765 spelled out the duties of various military commanders 
and provided specific guidance on how to conduct these exercises. The document meticulously 
planned the notification to STRIKE Forces, the required transportation, the details on logistics 
and personnel, and the instructions for command posts. While REFORGER was conducted under 
USAREUR and NATO auspices, these predecessors showed the United States military had 
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experience in performing large scale military exercises and deployments at a moment’s notice. 
Moreover, a memorandum for the Secretary of the General Staff, written by General Bruce 
Palmer, the U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff, stated that planners would, “Review the lessons of 
BIG LIFT and actions that have been subsequent to that time to determine what major gaps, if 
any, exist in our plans and preparations for the REFORGER Exercise.”87 Thus BIG LIFT, and 
likely other plans from the USARSTRIKE Command, aided in the planning and execution of 
REFORGER.  
 REFORGER I was the first in the twenty-four year-long exercise series and was the 
product of months of planning and preparation. The first document that shows the beginning of 
REFORGER I planning is a fact sheet given to the Acting Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army on 28 
March 1968, while the aftermath of the Tet Offensive was still roiling Vietnam. It describes the 
approved funds ($11.1 million) and force package for the exercise.88 The Exercise Concept of the 
United States Commander in Chief Europe (USCINCEUR) is shown in figure 1, enumerating the 
various phases of REFORGER I. 
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Figure 1: Exercise Concept 89 
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 Documents from August 1968 indicate hesitation on the part of the JCS due to lack of 
funding. A memorandum from General Bruce Palmer, Jr., U.S. Vice Chief of Staff, states that, 
“The JCS concluded that fiscal considerations override the valid military and political 
requirements to conduct REFORGER I…and it was proposed to postpone the exercise. However, 
final action depends on decisions by DOD and State.”90 Fiscal concerns from the JCS were 
legitimate, as illustrated by the cost of previous exercises, but the commitment to conduct 
REFORGER took precedence. “In view of NATO commitment of the 24th Inf Div [division] and 
other REFORGER units and the requirement to redeploy these units to USAREUR within 30 
days, the Army staff is taking measures to expedite delivery of required equipment and 
assignment of sufficient personnel to enable the units to attain the desired state of readiness by 
the end of CY [Calendar year] 68.”91 This was a concern in the Army staff because the 24th 
Infantry Division, the unit slated for REFORGER I, was operating below capacity in personnel 
and equipment due to the competing demands of the Vietnam War.92 Despite the possibility of 
REFORGER being cancelled or postponed, the Army staff knew that preparation was still 
essential. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) worked to ensure the units 
participating would reach 100 percent personnel capacity by the end of September 1968 and the 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) worked to ensure the 24th Infantry Division 
reached its equipment goals by the 1st of October.93 With these projections, the Army staff 
believed that the 24th Infantry Division would be “Filled, equipped, and trained to participate in 
Exercise REFORGER I by 31 December 1968.”94 
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 With the necessary personnel and logistics issues being resolved, the staff began detailed 
planning for REFORGER I. A planning conference was scheduled for mid-October 1968 with 
the goal to “Formulate plans for preparation and movement of Exercise REFORGER I units to 
and from departure airfields, and resolve those problems [related to personnel, equipment, and 
training] CONUS-based units may have in preparing for Exercise REFORGER I.”95 The 
conference, hosted by USAREUR, was held on 15 October in Heidelberg, Germany.96 The 
planners covered forty-five points that spelled out the aspects of REFORGER that were yet to be 
solidified. While many of the details of the conference are not germane to this thesis, everything 
from the classification for units in a Tempory Change of Station to the basic equipment that 
soldiers could bring was covered. However, the notes on this conference indicate that funding for 
the exercise was still awaiting approval.97 
 An essential aspect of the exercise would be the drawing of equipment from the 
POMCUS sites. The POMCUS program, starting before Exercise Big Lift, was what allowed the 
United States to rapidly deploy thousands of troops to Europe in less than 30 days and have them 
prepared to fight upon arrival, which was the required commitment to NATO. Nearly all of the 
24th Infantry Division’s equipment was already in Germany stored at various POMCUS locations 
and would be drawn for use in the REFORGER I gunnery exercises and FTX. Ensuring that 
troops were successful in drawing this equipment required a test of the operations of the 
POMCUS sites. In November 1968, Exercise CAR CREW was conducted to “test the techniques 
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and procedures to receive REFORGER forces in USAREUR.”98 A battalion assigned to 
USAREUR relocated to Rhein Main to simulate the arrival of 24th Infantry Division troops in 
Germany. They were transported to the POMCUS sites, collected the necessary materiel and 
vehicles, moved to a training center to test fire the artillery and armored weapons, and then 
returned the equipment to storage.99 The exercise was successful, and REFORGER planners 
could rest assured knowing that arrival in Germany and collection of materiel was meticulously 
planned and organized. The next step was to solidify plans for the shipment of troops from the 
United States to Germany. 
 In mid-December planners attended a movement planning conference for REFORGER I 
at the Pentagon to generate movement plans for the exercise.100 This conference determined that 
the advanced party dates for REFORGER I would be 6-19 January, with the main body being 
deployed during a 50-hour period from 19-22 January, with flights arriving in Germany every 
thirty minutes. Nuremberg was listed as the primary airfield, with Fürstenfeldbruck and Rhein 
Main as alternates. Major Brice Bell, the REFORGER Action Officer, stated: 
The conference was worthwhile and very productive. By having it at JCS level, 
all required actions were completed expeditiously without deferral or 
postponement because of indecisiveness. Those areas where the representatives 
could not speak with authority were immediately covered by a telephone call to 
the authority and an answer obtained. At the conclusion of the conference, 
therefore, there were no U.S. Army unresolved problems.101 
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Planning for movement was now complete, but commanders still worried about the impact of 
personnel and equipment shortages on unit training. 
 These concerns were addressed in a training staff visit to Fort Riley, Kansas, from 15-17 
December. The purpose of the visit was to observe soldiers of the 24th Infantry Division in their 
training to determine if they were ready to deploy. Staff officers observed various units in 
training and commented on four issues. The 2nd Battalion, 70th Armored Regiment was training 
the procedures to load tanks onto flat rail cars, and despite German rail cars being narrower than 
those in the United States, the training was considered worthwhile. Units based in the continental 
United States did not often have the opportunity to conduct these operations, so the training 
provided needed knowledge for the loading of tanks collected from POMCUS sites.102 
 The 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry Regiment conducted various field training exercises under 
their company commanders; these exercises covered different aspects that commanders believed 
needed additional emphasis prior to deployment. These companies were trained on the selection 
and preparation of defensive position, the proper placement of personnel and weapons for 
defense, and various small-unit field movements. The report author, Major Scholl, noted that, 
“Personnel participating in the training were alert and appeared interested.”103 Soldiers in the 2nd 
Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment were also conducting training, but focused on attack drill and 
clearing objectives. Major Scholl wrote that, “Personnel moved aggressively and with 
enthusiasm. [But] During one mounted attack over an open area it was felt that personnel 
dismounted earlier than might have been desirable or necessary.”104 This type of training shows a 
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dedication on the part of both commanders and soldiers in preparation for the first REFORGER 
exercise, and visiting staff noticed marked improvement in the conduct and ability of soldiers in 
the 24th Infantry Division. 
 The report noted personnel shortages for deploying units, as the 24th Infantry Division 
was still short approximately 400 soldiers. However, more soldiers were due to arrive, and the 
expectation was that all units would be at 100 percent capacity by the end of December.105 These 
issues regarding capacity were addressed in a second staff visit that occurred on 24 December 
1968. Prior to this visit, actions were taken to ensure that personnel would be transferred to units 
that were short of their deployable strength. 150 additional riflemen were requested for the 24th 
Infantry Division; 85 soldiers were reassigned from the Skill Development Base at Fort Benning, 
Georgia, while 80 recent graduates from Advance Individual Training were being diverted from 
Europe to the 24th Infantry Division. Furthermore, 100 personnel were reassigned from the 1st 
Battalion, 63rd Armored Regiment to the 24th Infantry Division. Colonel James Patterson, the 
DCSPER, noted that, “As a result of the actions outlined above which have been and are to be 
taken it is expected that the 24th Infantry Division will be capable of participating in Exercise 
REFORGER I with the required 10,512 personnel.”106 Continued evaluation of troop numbers, 
training, and communications allowed the planners of Exercise REFORGER I to supplement the 
24th Infantry Division until it was at full strength, figure out how to ship over 5,000 troops to 
Europe in a 50 hour window, and ensure that troops knew how to collect their equipment after 
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 On 30 December 1968, the headquarters at Fort Riley, Kansas, issued the movement 
order for units that were taking part in REFORGER I. The reporting date for the Advanced Party 
was 19 January 1969, with the Main Party reporting on 22 January 1969. Forces would redeploy 
back to the United States between 8 February and 15 April. Below, in Figure 2, is the graph that 
shows the Unit, Unit Identification Code, Number of Officers, Warrant Officers, and Enlisted 
Men that were set to deploy.  
 
Figure 2: Movement Order REFORGER I 
107 
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This preparation for REFORGER I was extensive, and necessarily so. REFORGER I was the 
first of its series, and the preparation taken would provide a template for all subsequent exercises 
to follow.  
  On 3 January 1969 at 23:34 hours Exercise REFORGER I was initiated, and the Fort 
Riley Movement Control Group (MCG) began the process to stage and transport cargo and 
troops.108 A hangar at Marshall Army Air-Field (AAF) was dedicated to the staging and 
palletization of equipment for the exercise. All baggage and equipment were shipped from 
Marshall AAF to Forbes Air Force Base (AFB) on 2 ½ ton trucks prior to departure. Baggage for 
personnel, however, were sent on the day of departure to ensure that it would not be separated 
from the troops.109 During this process the MCG noticed very few issues that needed rectifying, 
and the issues that did arise were quickly solved and noted for future exercises.110 Personnel 
were transported to Forbes AFB in military and commercial buses and a few tactical vehicles 2 
½ hours before their flight time to allow for travel, briefing, and onboarding. The deployment of 
troops to Germany for REFORGER I was split into three separate phases. The torch party, 
containing command, signal, and supply elements, deployed between 4 and 7 January. The 
advance party, with supervisors, maintenance personnel, and vehicle operators arrived between 8 
and 19 January. The main body, mostly comprised of combat troops, deployed in under 45 hours 
from 19-21 January, and met with the advanced party and their equipment in Grafenwöhr, West 
Germany.111 
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 The advanced party personnel were responsible for the collection and transportation of 
equipment from the various POMCUS sites and would have it ready for test firing upon arrival 
of the main body forces. Major General Linton S. Boatwright, the 24th Infantry Division 
Commander, expressed concerns over the loading of tracked vehicles onto rail cars, but the 
expertise of troops “Permitted them to meet their three-hour time limit in every instance.”112 
Over 900 tacked vehicles, along with their operating personnel, were brought to Grafenwöhr 
aboard 26 trains.113 Maj. Gen. Boatwright noted that only two minor road accidents occurred and 
only 2.3 percent of vehicles needed repair, prompting him to boast, “This exercise has come 
about as close to following its plan as any I’ve ever seen.”114 Boatwright praised the personnel in 
theater, noting, “The logisticians currently operating in this theater are some of the best I’ve ever 
worked with.”115 There is every indication that the storing of equipment in the POMCUS 
program was successful, and that the collection of equipment, materiel, and vehicles ran 
smoothly.  
 On 20 January 1969 the first plane carrying troops from the 5,000-man main body arrived 
in Nuremburg. The plane, carrying 51 members of the 5th Surgical Hospital from Fort Knox, 
Kentucky, landed at 09:03 local time. The next plane was set to arrive at 12:55, and the C-141 
Starlifters from the United States Air Force were scheduled to arrive every 30 minutes, with the 
last arriving at 19:30 on the 21st. General Howell M. Estes, Commander of the Military Airlift 
Command, greeted the plane and said, “This exercise does not herald anything especially 
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significant in terms of strategic mobility. Rather, I would ask that all of you pay more attention 
to what I think is the true essential demonstration this morning, teamwork.”116 General Estes 
spoke true; the amount of planning, preparation, and teamwork between the Army, Air Force, 
and all units involved in REFORGER I allowed it to succeed. However, while it is true that 
REFORGER was not the first rapid mobilization and response exercise of its era, planners were 
able to transport 12,000 U.S. Army troops from the United States to Germany in just fifteen 
days. Therefore, the deployment of forces in REFORGER I was significant, and set the standard 
for all future rapid reinforcement exercises and operations.  
 After arriving in Germany, main body troops rode in hourly convoys and rail shipments 
to the Seventh Army Training Center in Grafenwöhr, and by 21 January over 7,000 troops were 
preparing for Field Training Exercise CARBIDE ICE, set to begin on 29 January.117 Before the 
FTX could start, however, the weapons, tanks, and artillery pieces needed to be tested. This was 
done to ensure functionality after long periods of storage in the POMCUS sites and to provide 
troops with additional training in sighting-in their equipment. An M-60A1 tank from the 1st 
Battalion, 70th Armored Regiment fired the first test round, and began the process to zero-in, 
which requires three consecutive hits in an 18-inch target stationed 1,200 meters away. Other 
tanks, mortars, machine guns, and rifles were test fired in preparation for Exercise CARBIDE 
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Ice.118 On 28 January, Major General Boatright ordered the movement of troops to initial 
positions for the FTX.119 
 U.S. based troops of the 24th Infantry Division were dubbed the Blue Forces and were 
pitted against the Orange Forces, comprised of European based troops from the same division. 
CARBIDE ICE was a free-play maneuver that was “designed to evaluate the operational 
capability of forces, provide combined arms training, sharpen the troop’s combat skills, and 
check out repair, supply, and management techniques in battle conditions.”120 Umpires for the 
FTX were stationed in Blue and Orange Force headquarters all the way down to individual 
companies conducting field operations. This was to ensure that the exercise did not get out of 
hand and combat outcomes were adjudicated fairly. The Air Force was assigned to conduct an 
average of 88 sorties per day, on behalf of both sides. The scales were tipped in the favor of the 
Blue Forces, which boasted an Honest John Tactical Missile battalion, capable of launching 
nuclear-tipped missiles.121 While a main purpose of REFORGER was to respond to Soviet 
aggression without resorting to nuclear power, it was essential that field units have access to 
tactical nuclear arms to instantly respond to Soviet escalation.  
 Lieutenant General Donald V. Bennett, the Commander of the U.S. Army VII Corps that 
was one of two corps tasked with the defense of Europe, was the maneuver director for Exercise 
CARBIDE ICE. Bennett iterated the exercise goals, “To achieve this maximum training I have to 
make sure both sides conduct delaying actions, covering forces actions, defensive action, day and 
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night withdrawals, and both counter and fixed attacks.”122  Not only was CARBIDE ICE helpful 
in training combat troops, but it provided training for high command headquarters as well.  
 Umpires adjudicated the results of unit maneuver and simulated combat actions. Combat 
outcomes were somewhat artificial, and the training improved the functioning of headquarters to 
a greater extent that it did small units. This essentially means that the main military purpose of 
REFORGER was to rehearse the deployment and defense of Europe at a strategic and 
operational level. That does not mean, however, that the United States and NATO would make 
that fact known. CARBIDE ICE lasted from 29 January to 4 February 1969, and the last United 
States European Command Press release said of the FTX, “The battle was over, no one was 
killed, no home or crops destroyed, no vehicles lost, but valuable training was obtained; training 
on the terrain that REFORGER troops might someday be called on to defend.”123 The training 
conducted in Exercise REFORGER I and FTX CARBIDE ICE allowed the United States to 
show NATO that U.S. forces were capable of reinforcing and defending western Europe within 
thirty days of mobilization.  
 The last essential part of Exercise REFORGER I was the repairing and returning of 
equipment back to the POMCUS sites and the departure of main body and rear party troops. The 
first plane departed Nüremburg Airport at 12:40 on 6 February 1969. The 5,000 troops in the 
main body for REFORGER I would all be back in their CONUS bases by 22 February. The 
remaining soldiers prepared to return all equipment to the POMCUS sites and were set to fly out 
of Rhein-Main Air Base on 14 February. The commander of the Surgical Team, Captain Robert 
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R. Turman said, “I think we learned a lot during REFORGER I.”124 He did not go into any detail, 
but it is clear that REFORGER I gave necessary training to all units that were responsible for 
Western European defense. REFORGER I was a success in many ways. Not only did it provide 
needed training, but it fulfilled NATO commitments and tested the U.S. military logistical 
network. Moreover, it showed that such an exercise was possible and provided an outline that 
REFORGER exercises for the next 23 years could follow.  
 Subsequent exercises contained many strategic, operational, and logistical similarities to 
the first. The goal of REFORGER, one that remained unchanged from its inception in 1969 to 
the last exercise in 1993, was to rapidly deploy CONUS-based forces to Germany to rehearse the 
defense of Western Europe in the event of a Soviet invasion. This exercise had to be conducted 
annually to ensure that all forces committed to the defense of NATO had a high level of 
readiness and ability. Much of the processes that were used to ship troops and materiel from the 
United States to Germany did not change. There were, however, some notable differences in 
subsequent exercises that show how REFORGER evolved. For example, it should be noted that 
the naming of REFORGER exercises from the number in the sequence to the year it was 
conducted was changed after REFORGER V conducted in 1973; the next exercise in the series 
was called REFORGER 74. 
 REFORGER II, 5 October to 4 December 1970, was conducted in a similar way to 
REFORGER I. The CONUS based troops deployed from the United States to Germany, 
collected their materiel from POMCUS sites, conducted gunnery exercises, completed a FTX, 
and redeployed back to the United States after placing the equipment back in POMCUS. These 
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were the tasks that were the main tasks for every REFORGER exercise. What was constantly 
changing, however, were the units involved. The main unit for REFORGER I was the 24th 
Infantry Division; when REFORGER II was planned and conducted, the task of rapidly 
deploying to Germany was given to the 1st Mechanized Infantry Division.125 It is unclear why the 
1st Infantry Division took part in Exercise REFORGER II, but it is clear that the units involved in 
the REFORGER exercises did not always remain the same.  
 Another major difference between the various exercises was the number of troops 
involved. The Secretary of Defense approved 12,660 soldiers for Exercise REFORGER I.126 
10,657 of these troops deployed from the United States to Germany to take part in the 
exercise.127 REFORGER II had an authorized force of 12,247 troops, and while these forces had 
similar obstacles relating to division readiness as seen in REFORGER I, there was little 
difference in scale when comparing the troops that deployed.128 However, when looking at later 
exercises, like REFORGER 88, the V Corps fielded more than 50,000 troops to take part in FTX 
CERTAIN CHALLENGE. The VII Corps, which face off against the V Corps in the FTX, 
fielded a comparable force.129 REFORGER 88 still featured the steps of all REFORGER 
exercises, but it was conducted on a massive scale. The reasoning behind the scale of this 
REFORGER is unknown, but it did not impact the effectiveness of the exercise; it merely 
required more preparation. Similar to the preparation seen with Exercises BIG LIFT and CAR 
CREW, OPLAN 629, and General Plan 765, the V Corps conducted Exercise Caravan Guard 88 
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which, “Stressed rapid movement and solid command and control techniques.”130 This showed 
that emphasis on training remained high throughout the entire exercise series.  
 Lastly, while the main strategic goal of REFORGER remained unchanged for its entirety, 
the operational focus changed over time. REFORGER I focused on providing training for troops 
in all types of offensive and defensive operations that would be needed to counter a Soviet 
invasion, focusing largely on field movements and small unit tactics.131 As REFORGER 
continued, there was still heavy importance placed on how field units conduct the FTX; however, 
there was also increased emphasis on training for communications, command and control, and 
cooperation at all levels. FTX CERTAIN SENTINEL in REFORGER 79 emphasized the 
importance of this communication and cooperation at command levels, which was necessary 
given the growing size of troops involved.132  
 The last REFORGER exercise was conducted in 1993, two years after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. Documents covering REFORGER 92 and 93 are still classified, and despite 
several Freedom of Information Act requests, remain unavailable for this thesis.  It is clear, 
however, that the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 meant that the threat of Soviet invasion had 
ended, necessitating an end to the exercises that were created to stand against it.  
Conclusion 
 The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 lifted the world from a state of fear and uncertainty 
that began in 1945. The end of the Cold War also meant an end to the practices that helped 
ensure cooperation among western allies, meaning the 24-year long REFORGER exercise series 
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was also at an end. REFORGER has long been thought of as a monumental exercise series put in 
place to defend Western Europe from Soviet invasion while also appeasing calls for budgetary 
restrictions. It is true that the military purpose of these exercises was to rehearse the rapid 
deployment of forces to Europe, and congressional budget cuts made this politically necessary. 
This thesis, however, has proven that a main goal of REFORGER was to instill confidence in the 
United States’ commitment to the defense of Western Europe. It was a diplomatic exercise as 
much as it was a military and political one.  
 The end of World War II did not bring peace to the European continent. The splitting of 
the Soviet Union from the Allied Powers propelled the world into yet another conflict that would 
go on for over four decades. The Korean and Vietnam Wars showed that this Cold War could 
erupt into a hot war at any time, and that preparation for military action was essential to ensure 
the defense of Western Europe. The solution for the early years of the Cold War was massive 
nuclear retaliation, which was problematic if the Western powers wished to have any land or 
people left to defend. The adoption of Flexible Response and Forward Defense under the 
Kennedy Administration was a necessary progression in the evolution of Cold War doctrine, and 
the previously mentioned budgetary restrictions necessitated a program that would convince 
NATO of ongoing U.S. commitment to Western European defense.  
 The 1967 Trilateral Agreement is among the most important documents in REFORGER 
history, because it spells out the process that the United States committed to taking when the 
need to reinforce NATO forces in Europe arose. REFORGER was initially conceived as a means 
to reunite the 24th Infantry Division with its advanced brigade stationed in Germany. Those 
reinforcements, according to the 1967 agreement, would need to deploy within thirty days of 
mobilization. Exercise REFORGER was conceived and first conducted in 1969 to ensure that the 
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units called on for the defense of West Germany would be capable of rapid deployment. By the 
1980s the United States would increase its commitment in this regard, promising to reinforce 
NATO with five divisions within thirty days of mobilization. Such a commitment made the 
conventional defense of West Germany feasible, winding the nuclear clock backwards from 
midnight. 
 The Trilateral Agreement, however, also served as a principle diplomatic document, and 
this thesis has shown that members of several presidential administrations, the U.S. Armed 
Forces, and the individual soldiers conducting the exercises were aware of this diplomatic 
mission. It served as a continuing bulwark against the doubts of U.S. commitment in Europe; 
these doubts from NATO allies were justified because the U.S. Congress continuously lowered 
the military budget in the early years of REFORGER, causing the budget for military exercises 
to be cut as well. REFORGER was on the chopping block numerous times throughout its history, 
but several military, diplomatic, and political leaders argued for its necessity. U.S.-NATO 
relations during the Cold War were often tenuous, and REFORGER was a reminder that the 
United States valued the alliance.  
 Militarily, REFORGER was a tremendous logistical and strategic success. The ability to 
rapidly deploy thousands of troops to Europe in a matter of weeks in 1969, and days by the 
1980s, showed the progression of the logistical network and planning of the U.S. Army, and how 
quickly it improved. Not only were troops able to deploy rapidly, but the collection of equipment 
at POMCUS sites proved that strategic depots for materiel were essential in RRF exercises and 
operations. 
 This thesis aimed to view REFORGER as its own history and analyze how that history 
impacted diplomatic relations and the evolution of military strategy. This has been accomplished, 
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but the research is not yet done. The reaction of the Soviet Union to REFORGER is still 
unknown, and the archives of the former Soviet Union likely have documentation that could 
expand this history beyond the perspective of the United States and NATO. Moreover, the 
impact of REFORGER on future Rapid Reaction Forces would provide a necessary 
understanding of the exercise series’ lasting impact. As time goes on, more documents in the 
National Archives will be declassified and future researchers can explore these unanswered 
questions.  
 REFORGER is an essential part of Cold War history, as it allowed the United States to 
both maintain good relations with its closest allies and to ensure that its soldiers were fully 
prepared to face the potential challenges that a Soviet invasion would bring. Moreover, it shows 
a level of cooperation between the United States and its international allies that is inspiring. 
Through compromise and dedication, the West was able to prepare and establish a strong defense 
against an enemy with values and systems that were antithetical to the freedom and self-
determination gained by victory over Nazi Germany in 1945. REFORGER, as a historical event, 
broadly represents the pinnacle of Western unity; a unity that can, and should be, sought after in 
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